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SECURITIES REGULATION SURVEY
OVERVIEW
During the 1991 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed four separate areas of securities law. First, in First Golden Ban-
corporation v. Weiszmann, I the court strongly ruled against third-party in-
demnification for liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 Second, in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,3
the court addressed the procedural issue of whether an action is barred
for an untimely filing of the complaint under section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19334 (1933 Act) and held if the statute of limitations
has expired, the complaint must be dismissed regardless of the unusual
complexities of the case. Third, in Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc.,5 the court held an interest in an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan (ESOP) is an investment contract under the Securities Act of 1933,
and, as a security, it is not outside the reach of federal securities regula-
tion despite the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 6
Finally, in Garcia v. Cordova,7 the Tenth Circuit held that purchase of
stock did not trigger a rule lOb-5(b) duty to disclose corporate asset
appraisal information to selling shareholders because the speculative
and unreliable nature of the asset information removed the corporate
insider from any disclosure duty. This Article focuses on the distin-
guishing points between each Tenth Circuit decision and the corre-
sponding lower court decision. The Tenth Circuit rigorously
interpreted and precisely applied the federal securities regulations in re-
versing the district court in all but the First Golden decision.
I. INDEMNIFICATION FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE SHORT SWING PROFIT
PROVISION: FIRST GOLDEN BANcoRPORATIoN V. WEISZMANN
A. Introduction
Corporations commonly indemnify employees against liabilities in-
curred in the scope of their corporate functions. The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prohibits "insiders" from using their information
access in short term trading of the corporations securities.8 In First
Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann, 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed: (1)
whether profits realized by an insider from the purchase and sale of
company securities within a period less than six months may be recov-
1. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
3. 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
5. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
7. 930 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
9. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
1019
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ered and (2) whether the insider can subsequently seek third party in-
demnification for liability resulting from a section 16(b) claim under the
1934 Act.10 The court strongly rejected the indemnifications argument
as violative of the public policies underlying federal securities laws. 1
B. Facts
Ronald Weiszmann acquired stock in First Golden through a tender
offer he made for the company. When Weiszmann sold the stock, First
Golden alleged the sale occurred within six months of its acquisition
making Weiszmann liable under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act for profits
from the sale.12 Weiszmann counterclaimed against First Golden and
initiated third-party complaints against both Morgan Stanley, who acted
as Weiszmann's financial advisors, and Lindner Management, the even-
tual purchaser of the stock.13 The primary issue on appeal involved
Weiszmann's request for indemnity with respect to his potential liability
to First Golden. The district court rejected the indemnity claim and dis-
missed the remaining third-party claims with prejudice.' 4 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the rejection of indemnity, but remanded the third-
party claims for further proceedings.
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit stated there is no right to indemnity for liability
under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act as a matter of law. 15 Section 16(b)
does not require proof that the insider improperly obtained trading in-
formation; proof of an insider relationship that gives rise to potential
improper use of information in a trade is enough.16 The policy behind
section 16(b) is to deter transactions that have a high potential for fraud.
Imposing strict liability for use of insider information in the purchase
and subsequent sale of securities within a period less than six months
achieves this deterrence.'
7
The court highlighted an Illinois case, In re Olympia Brewing Co.,
18
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
11. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 728-29 (The Securities Acts are not intended to protect
parties who violate the Acts, and indemnification would undermine the deterrent affect of
the Acts.).
12. Id. at 728.
13. Id. The third-party claims included: 1) indemnity against liability to First Golden;
2) outrageous conduct; 3) breach of contract; 4) fraud; 5) controlling person liability; 6)
principal-agent liability; and 7) negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs sought relief in the
third-party claims for reimbursement of attorneys fees and costs incurred during the litiga-
tion, and recovery of commissions and profit realized by Morgan Stanley from the sale of
the stock.
14. The district court stated that third-party actions can be maintained under Rule
14(a) only for claims where the third-party defendant is asserted to be secondarily liable to
the third-party plaintiff for the third-party plaintiff's liability to the primary plaintiff.
Where the liability no longer exists, all subsequent claims are dismissed. Id.
15. Id; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
16. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 729.
17. Id.
18. 674 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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which held that Congress did not promulgate the 1933 and 1934 Acts to
protect parties who violated the Acts' provisions or to insure that in-
jured parties were reimbursed. Rather, the Acts were promulgated to
prevent future fraudulent activity.' 9 For these policy reasons, indemni-
fication from liability was rejected as counter to the strict liability of sec-
tion 16(b) violations.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the remaining third-party claims on
procedural grounds. 20 Although the third-party claims were related to
the indemnity claim,2 1 the district court may have overlooked some or
all of the claims as ancillary under Rule 18(a)2 2 since they were separate
claims for damages. To the extent that third-party claims are disguised
indemnity claims for the section 16(b) violation, the Tenth Circuit noted
the appropriateness of dismissing the claims with prejudice. 23 However,
since Weiszmann may have a legitimate claim to recover ommissions
paid to Morgan Stanley, and Morgan Stanley may have a controlling per-
son liability claim under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,24 the court should have addressed those third-party claims. 25
D. Conclusion
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act acts as a deterrent to
transactions that have a high potential for fraud. To allow indemnifica-
tion from liability for violating the Act would frustrate the strict liability
deterrence by protecting parties who violate the Act. The Tenth Circuit,
in First Golden, held third-party claims valid under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 18(a), but only if they are third-party claims and are not in-
demnity-related.
II. SECTION 13 OF THE 1933 SECURITIES ACT: ANIXTER V. HOME-STAKE
PRODUCTION CO.
A. Introduction
In Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,26 the Tenth Circuit addressed
the procedural question of whether an untimely filed action is barred
under Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933,27 even if the underlying
circumstances are uncommonly complex. The Tenth Circuit held that
regardless of the uncommon complexities, which obscured the fraud,
19. Id. at 612-13.
20. The remaining claims included: controlling person liability, principle-agent liabil-
ity, and negligent misrepresentation. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 730.
21. Id. at 729-30.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
23. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 731.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988).
25. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 732; See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th
Cir. 1987); Globus v. Law Research Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,
286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968).
26. 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
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sufficient warning of the fraud existed to toll the limitation period. Ac-
tions under section 11 or 12(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193328
must be brought within one year of the discovery of a fraudulent event,
and no more than three years following the sale of the securities.29
Since the statute of limitations expired, the court dismissed the claim.
B. Background
Plaintiffs Ivan A. Anixter, Blanche Dickenson, and Dolly Yoshida
filed suit in the Northern District of California alleging that Home-Stake
Production Company conspired over a ten-year period to violate federal
securities laws in selling oil and gas production interests. Following
years of procedural manipulations, a jury awarded plaintiffs damages of
approximatey $130,000,000.s ° Home-Stake appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit on the timeliness issue. Several dates and events are important to
the Anixter litigation: (1) in 1968, a class action suit was filed against
Home-Stake for violations of sections 10(b) and 17(a) of the federal se-
curities laws; 3 1 (2) in 1970, the SEC investigated Home-Stake; (3) in
1971, the Wall Street Journal reported on an SEC complaint about
Home-Stake's business practices; and (4) in 1973, the IRS and the SEC
investigated Home-Stake's Chapter X reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938 and the Wall Street Journal coverage of the event.
The Anixter plaintiffs originally filed suit against Home- Stake in fed-
eral court.3 2 The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
and tolled the one-year/three year limitation period found in Section 13
of the 1933 Act33 in the "interests of substantial justice" because of the
extraordinary facts and circumstances. 3 4 The court found that the cir-
cumstances of the case were unusual because of the ten-year duration of
the fraudulent scheme that was exacerbated by Home-Stake's alleged
fraud in the courts and violations of SEC rules. These circumstances
mandated the application of the equitable tolling of the statute of limita-
tions to prevent further fraudulent concealment and victimization of the
plaintiff investors.35 As support, the district court repeated a Supreme
Court pronouncement that the fraudulent concealment doctrine "is
read into every federal statute of limitation."'3 6 In addition, the court
noted that federal courts are not powerless "to hold that the statute of
limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with
28. Id. § 77k(l).
29. Id. § 77m.
30. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1430.
31. Geo. H. McFadden & Bro., Inc. v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 295 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.
Okla. 1968) (class representatives accepted settlement and withdrew the class certification
resulting in dismissal with prejudice).
32. In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
34. In re Home-Stake, 76 F.R.D. at 344.
35. Id. at 344-45.
36. Id. at 344 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)).
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the legislative .purpose."3 7 The district court concluded that where
there appears to have been a factual allegation that the defendants were
given fair notice of an action in progress, neither the one-year nor the
three-year limitation will bar the action.38
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the Section 13 language
that covers express causes of action under Sections 11 and 12. First, the
court found the statute of limitations clearly stated that discovery of an
action starts the one-year limitation on filing suit. Second, the Tenth
Circuit held this discovery language incorporated the doctrine of fraud-
ulent concealment because the language pegs accrual of a cause of ac-
tion that involves a concealed fraud to the date "after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
3 9
Third, the Tenth Circuit held the one-year after discovery provision of
Section 13 will not extend more than three years after the security was
offered to the public, or after its sale.40 Compliance with Section 13
requires that a plaintiff plead and prove facts showing that the filing was
timely with respect to both the one year and three year limitation
periods.
4 1
Senate debate on Section 13 reinforced the Tenth Circuit's reading
of the statute of limitation requirements. 4 2 The Anixter court noted that
all Senate members in the debates, agreed with the need for an absolute
bar, recognizing that liability must be extinguished to free boards of di-
rectors from fear of inheriting liability to suits. 43 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that section 13 is substantive rather than procedural, and un-
timely complaints must be dismissed as a matter of law.
44
The difficult issues involved in Anixter were whether there was suffi-
cient time and warning to discover Home-Stake's fraud and whether the
suit was filed timely. To answer the latter question, the court deter-
mined when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that fraud existed
through the exercise of diligence, which knowledge triggers the statute
of limitations. 4 5 Full knowledge of the existence of a claim is not re-
quired; inquiry notice of possible fraud or misrepresentation is sufficient
to begin the one-year filing limitation.46 The Tenth Circuit held that
37. Id. at 344 (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559
(1974)).
38. Id. at 345.
39. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1434 (quoting Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir.
1978) (fraudulent concealment is the common law counterpart of the discovery standard
prescribed by § 13 to limit actions brought under § 12(2), therefore the running of both
statutes of limitations is triggered by identical considerations)).
40. Id (construing 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988)).
41. Id. at 1434.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1434-35.
44. Id at 1434-36.
45. Id. at 1437.
46. Id.
1992] 1023
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facts triggering inquiry include any "sufficient storm warnings to alert a
reasonable person to the possibility that there were either misleading
statements or significant omissions involved in the sale."'4 7 The Tenth
Circuit held the Anixter plaintiffs had notice of (1) the 1971 SEC investi-
gation and complaint, (2) the court order for Home-Stake to remedy the
situation and (3) the two Wall StreetJournal articles highlighting Home-
Stake's activities. The Tenth Circuit concluded that since notice re-
quired only constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge4s and
Home-Stake's passive fraud spanned ten years, this gave sufficient
"storm warnings" to trigger the one-year filing limitation as a matter of
law.
4 9
Finally, the court addressed Home-Stake's assertion that the section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims were also untimely. Relying on Lampf v.
Gilbertson,50 the Tenth Circuit held the one-year/three-year statute of re-
pose would be inconsistent with tolling.5 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit de-
parted from precedent established in Hackbart v. Holmes52 and Bath v.
Bushkin5 3 in analyzing applicable limitation periods for 10(b) claims.
D. Conclusion
Supported by legislative history and the Supreme Court ruling in
Lampf, the Tenth Circuit decision strongly enforced the Section 13 stat-
ute of limitations against plaintiffs because they had sufficient "storm
warning" to realize a colorable action existed. The court held the stat-
ute of limitation is substantive rather than procedural and therefore eq-
uitable exceptions, which threatened to swallow the clear rules in
Section 13, will no longer be considered. In Anixter, the court warned
plaintiffs that a plain-language reading of statute limitation require-
ments is required and the statute will run from the date of the imputed
constructive knowledge of fraud.
III. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS QUALIFY AS SECURITIES:
USELTON V. COMMERCIAL LOVELACE MOTOR FREIGHT, INC.
A. Introduction
In Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. ,54 the Tenth Cir-
cuit determined (1) whether an interest in an Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plan (ESOP) is an investment contract security under the Securities
Acts5 5 and (2) if a security, whether an ESOP interest is outside the
47. Id. (quoting Cook v. Avier, 573 F.2d 685, 697 (lst Cir. 1978)).
48. Id. at 1438 n.35.
49. Id. at 1438.
50. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
51. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1441.
52. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
53. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990).
54. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Pepsico, Inc. v. Uselton, 112 S. Ct. 589
(1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988) (the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988) (the
Securities Act of 1934).
1024 [Vol. 69:4
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reach of federal securities regulation due to ERISA.56 The court de-




In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,5 8 the Supreme Court held that a financial
relationship constitutes an investment contract where the scheme in-
volves: (1) an investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3)
profits resulting solely from the efforts of others.5 9 After Howey, the
Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel60 determined
whether an employee benefit plan is an investment contract security
under the Securities Acts. Analyzing each element of the Howey test sep-
arately, the Daniel Court held a compulsory, non-contributory pension
plan did not constitute an investment contract subject to regulation
under the Securities Acts.6 1 In addition, this benefit plan must be vol-
untary. 62 An employee with no choice of participation in a plan, rather
than making an "investment," receives a defined benefit. 63 In Daniel,
the compulsory nature of the plan precluded any affirmative investment
decision "to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable
financial interest with the characteristics of a security." 64 Further, since
only the employer contributed to the plan, the employee was only re-
quired to accept employment. While an investment need not take the
form of cash,65 accepting employment and providing labor is not tangi-
ble and definable consideration given in exchange for an interest sub-
stantially resembling the characteristics of a security.6 6
Applying the second and third elements of Howey, the Court deter-
mined that because the plan's success depended on continued employer
contributions and not the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
57. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 572.
58. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (The Securities & Exchange Commission, in seeking to en-
join the Howey Company from using the mails and instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce in the offer and sale of unregistered and non-exempt securities in violation of the
Securities Act of 1933, determined whether Howey's instruments were investment con-
tracts thus subject to federal securities regulation.).
59. Id. at 301.
60. 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (questioning whether a participant in a company pension
plan could invoke the Securities Acts in an effort to recover benefits under the plan).
61. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
62. Id. at 554 n.2; see also O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (D. Md.
1982) (defining a voluntary plan).
63. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 554 n.3.
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id. at 560 n.12.
66. Id. at 560 (the employee is essentially selling his labor primarily to obtain a liveli-
hood, not to make an investment). The Court also rejected the argument that the em-
ployer contributions on behalf of the employee constituted an investment into the fund.
Because the contributions for each employee were identical regardless of individual em-
ployee performance or length of service, the contribution does not qualify as an invest-
ment by the employee. Id. at 561.
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others, the plan did not meet either test.67 In addition, any benefit re-
ceived by a participant in the plan was realized by meeting vesting re-
quirements rather than the plans investment success. 68 The Court
determined that viewed as a total compensation package, the possibility
of participating in the plan's asset earnings was far too speculative and
insubstantial to bring the transaction within the Securities Acts.
6 9
C. Facts of Uselton
The plaintiffs were 485 former union employees of Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc. (Lee Way), a common carrier engaged in the interstate and
intrastate transport of commodities. In 1976, Pepsico, Inc. acquired Lee
Way and operated the company as a wholly-owned subsidiary. In Au-
gust 1984, Pepsico sold Lee Way to defendant Commercial Lovelace
Motor Freight, Inc. (CL). CL solicited Lee Way's union employees to
participate in a wage reduction program, 70 which provided each em-
ployee an interest in CL's ESOP and a profit-sharing plan in return for
the employee's wage reduction. 7 1 Within a year, CL merged with Lee
Way and filed for bankruptcy.
The employees sought relief from CL for revocation of their partici-
pation in the ESOP and recovery of more than $6 million in wages lost
as a result of participation in the wage reduction program. 72 In their
federal securities claim, plaintiffs alleged that their interests in the ESOP
were investment contracts subject to federal securities regulation, pur-
suant to section 2(1) of the 1933 Act73 and section 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act.74 Additionally, CL's solicitation of Lee Way employees to accept an
interest in CL's ESOP as part of the wage reduction program constituted
a sale of an unregistered security and securities fraud in violation of sec-
tions 5 and 17(a) of the 1933 Act,7 5 and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 6
In December 1987, the district court ruled that plaintiffs' interests in the
ESOP were not investment contracts and were not securities under fed-
eral law. 77 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
67. Id. at 561-62 (even where a benefit plan is voluntary and passes the first Howey
test, profits from the plan must result from the efforts of others).
68. Id. at 562.
69. Id.
70. The program was mandatory for Lee Way's non-union salaried employees. Id at
570.
71. The voluntary reduction of 17.35%a from each employee was needed because CL
indicated it would otherwise fail. Id.
72. Plaintiffs also allege that Pepsico's sale of Lee Way to CL and its subsequent reac-
quisition of Lee Way's assets upon CL's bankruptcy were all part of a sham transaction
designed by Pepsico to liquidate Lee Way. Plaintiffs claimed that Pepsico violated federal
and Oklahoma securities laws and claimed its actions constituted common law fraud. Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988) (defining "security" to include investment contracts).
74. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
75. Id. § 77e.
76. Id. § 78j(b).





Applying Howey to the instant case, the Tenth Circuit determined
that plaintiffs' interests in the ESOP were voluntary and contributory as
a matter law and that the ESOP satisfied Howey's requirements for estab-
lishing the existence of an investment contract.78 Although an "invest-
ment of money" is required, the court noted that cash is not the only
form of contribution that will create an investment contract. The proper
inquiry is whether the economic realities of the transaction as a whole
demonstrated an exchange of value. 79 Unlike the plaintiffs in Daniel,
each employee in this case did more than contribute labor-they delib-
erately chose to surrender a portion of their wages in return for an
ESOP interest in the company.8 0 Thus, the plaintiffs' interests were
contributory as a matter of law.8 1 Further, the court found that a volun-
tary plan is one permitting employees the option to participate.8 2 Here,
each union employee had the option to accept employment under the
wage reduction program or continue under the existing union contract.
Employees electing to join the ESOP voluntarily gave up specific consid-
eration in the form of wages in exchange for a financial interest in the
ESOP.83 For this reason, and because the plan had all the characteris-
tics of a security, the court found that the plaintiffs made a voluntary
investment in a security.84 The second element of the Howey test requir-
ing a "common enterprise" was dispatched by the Uselton court without
analysis.8 5
The Tenth Circuit held the third prong of the Howey test does not
require that "profits come solely from the efforts of others."'8 6 The
Howey test is satisfied if: (1) the enterprise can reasonably be expected to
produce profits in the form of capital appreciation or other earnings re-
sulting from the investment8 7 and (2) the success or failure of the enter-
prise is significantly affected by the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts
of persons other than the investor.88 In this case, both requirements
78. Useton, 940 F.2d at 574.
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id. at 575. Two other courts have held that wage concessions constitute sufficient
tangible and definable consideration to serve as a "contribution" to an employee benefit
plan for purposes of the Howey test. Id. See Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp.
1274, 1291 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep 93,772 at
98,625-26 (D.D.C. May 18, 1988).
82. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 575.
83. Id.
84. The SEC concurs with the conclusion that an employee who is given a choice
whether to participate in a voluntary pension plan; and decides to contribute a portion of
his earnings to such a plan, has made an investment decision in a security. Id. at 575-76
n.5.
Further, the "save the company, save your job" motivation by CL's wage reduction
program does not make the program involuntary because the union employees were free
to choose not to participate in the program. Id. at 576 n.7.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id. at 576 n.8.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
10271992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
were satisfied because profit from the plaintiff's ESOP interest occurred
through dividend distributions and appreciation in the value of the
stock. The profits from the ESOP plan resulted from the effort of CL's
management and each employee in the plan.89 Since each employee in
the program was dependent on the efforts of others to realize any bene-
fit from the investment decision, the ESOP satisfied the third element of
Howey and is distinguishable from other voluntary, contributory em-
ployee benefit plans. 90
In addition to support from Daniel that the ESOP was an investment
contract, 9 1 the SEC 92 and Congress93 concur with this view. The ad-
ministrative and congressional records regarding employee benefits
support the view that CL's ESOP was a security.
94
1. Securities Acts Regulation of ESOP Interests
Because the ESOP in Uselton was extensively regulated by ERISA, a
question arose as to whether the alternate regulation of ERISA removed
the ESOP investment contract from federal securities laws. 95 An invest-
ment contract is a federally regulated security unless the context re-
quires otherwise. 96 The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 13 of
the 1933 Act to mean that even if an instrument qualifies as a security
due to factual circumstances underlying the transaction, the context of
other federal regulation may still remove the investment from federal
securities laws.
9 7
The Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether non-securi-
ties-related federal regulations prevented application of the Securities
Acts in Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co..98 In Holloway, the court
concluded that the fundamental purpose of securities regulation is to
89. Id. at 576-77.
90. Id. A defined benefit plan paying fixed or determinable benefits based on factors
such as age of retirement, is not sufficient. As here, an ESOP with defined contribution
plan produces benefits based on factors such as the amount of contribution and the plan's
investment success. Id. at 577 n.10.
91. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 563-69.
92. The SEC has expressed its view that employee interests in voluntary contributory
employee benefit plans are securities. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 578 n.13.
93. In a report analyzing the need to enact ERISA, the Senate focused on plans that
would be subject to such regulation. The Senate described its understanding that pension
and profit-sharing plans are exempt from coverage under the 1933 Act, unless the plan is a
voluntary contributory pension plan that invests in the employer company's securities in
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the employer. Id. at 579.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 580.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1988).
97. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982); see also Daniel, 439 U.S. at
569-70.
98. 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1013 (1990). The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Holloway for further consideration in light of Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), which considered whether the existence of another regulatory
scheme significantly reduces the risk of a security, thereby rendering application of the
Securities Acts unnecessary. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65. On remand of Holloway, the Tenth
Circuit determined that Reves did not undercut the Holloway analysis and decided Holloway
is still valid and in line with Marine Bank and Daniel. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 580 n.15.
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protect the investor from the sale of worthless securities through mis-
representation.9 9 Federal securities acts achieve this purpose by requir-
ing disclosure to investors of "relevant, accurate information upon
which to base an investment decision" and by providing "meaningful
remedies for investors when the anti-fraud provisions of the laws have
been violated."'10 0 Therefore, if alternate federal regulation "abun-
dandy protects" the investor, the alternate regulation may displace ap-
plication of federal securities laws as duplicative and unnecessary. 10 1
2. Alternate Investor Protection Under ERISA
Whether ERISA provides protection for investors in an ESOP de-
pends on whether the disclosure and remedial purposes of the Securities
Acts are met. 10 2 The disclosure requirement is met if the alternate reg-
ulation either compels disclosure of "relevant, accurate information
upon which to base an investment decision" or allows federal regulators
to act on behalf of investors "to monitor the issuing entity and to take
corrective actions to protect their investments."1 03 The Uselton court
dismissed ERISA as being an invalid alternative regulation to the Securi-
ties Acts for three reasons.
First, although ERISA requires disclosure of an ESOP plan's provi-
sions, the disclosure is provided only to new plan participants'" within
ninety days after the individual joins the plan. 10 5 Further, the ERISA
disclosure is intended only to inform participants of their rights and ob-
ligations under the plan, not to disclose information regarding the
plan's financial soundness. 10 6 Although the information required for
disclosure under the Securities Acts is available to an ERISA plan par-
ticipant upon request 10 7 the information is not automatically provided
for potential participants. In short, ERISA does not disclose the infor-
mation required by Holloway and the Securities Acts.'
0 8
Second, authority for federal monitoring, provided by ERISA's re-
quirement that plan administrators file annual reports with the Secretary
of Labor,10 9 fail to match the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Acts. The Secretary can enforce ERISA funding and fiduciary responsi-
bility requirements on ESOP plan administrators through civil or admin-
99. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786; see also Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-59; Daniel, 439 U.S.
at 569-70.
100. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786.
101. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
102. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786.
103. Id.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988) (defining ERISA participant); Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581
n.16.
105. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581 n.17 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1988)).
106. Id. at 581; 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1988) (general disclosure of the source of financ-
ing and the identity of the organization providing benefits is required).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2),(4) (1988) (plan administrator must provide the annual
report to a plan participant upon request).
108. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582.
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (1988).
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istrative actions,110 though this authority is inadequate for taking
"corrective actions" on behalf of plan participants for the purpose of
protecting participants' investments. I1
Third, federal securities laws can not be carried out effectively un-
less the alternate federal regulation provides a meaningful remedy to
plan participants who claim they were fraudulently induced into joining
the plan. 112 The Securities Acts authorize private damage actions by
investors to recover from persons making false statements of material
fact or who act fraudulently in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. 13 Additionally, the Securities Acts permit fraudulently-in-
duced investors to rescind the fraudulent transaction and recover the
amount of their investment.1 14 Here, ERISA provided civil enforce-
ment for recovery of benefits under a plan," 15 but provided no specific
remedy for fraud or misrepresentation in connection with an individ-
ual's decision to join an ERISA-regulated plan. 16 A breach of fiduciary
duty claim is also invalid until the individual becomes a participant
under an ERISA plan." 7 Thus, the Uselton court concluded that ERISA
addresses many of the requirements of the Securities Acts, but protects
only post-investment rights under an approved ESOP plan. Pre-partici-
pation fraud and misrepresentation are actionable only under the Secur-
ities Acts.' 18
The court commented on, without deciding, the question of
whether an action could be maintained against a non-fiduciary as a
"party in interest" under ERISA.119 Available authority is split on the
issue of non-fiduciary liability, 120 but the court suggested that a relation-
ship such as between Pepsico and CL could qualify as a statutory viola-
tion potentially subject to redress by a court.
121
110. See id. § 1132(a)(2),(5) (1988).
111. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 788.
112. Id. at 786.
113. The 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1990).
114. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582; see, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D.Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767,
773 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988).
116. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582. Additional ERISA civil enforcement provisions include
the right to enforce ERISA's plan disclosure, funding, and administrative requirements,
and the right to obtain "appropriate relief" for breach of fiduciary duty by an ERISA plan
administrator or other person who exercises discretionary control or authority over the
plan or its assets. Id. at 582-83; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2)-(4), 1109 (1988).
117. Useton, 940 F.2d at 583.
118. Id. at 583 n.19. The court also noted the narrow distinctions drawn between ER-
ISA actions allowing recision and restitution of funds from a plan amendment, as opposed
to the recision of plan participation and restitution of employee contributions as in the
Uselton case. Id. at 583 n.20.
119. Id. at 584 n.21.
120. Compare Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1988) (non-fiduciaries are not
liable under ERISA) with Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) and
Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987) (non-fiduci-
aries are liable under ERISA).




The Tenth Circuit's two-part holding is consistent with both the
SEC's purpose of investor protection and Congress' purposes in creat-
ing ERISA. First, voluntary employee participation in a contributory
ESOP plan is considered an investment contract and therefore a security
that is subject to the Securities Acts. Second, although it extensively reg-
ulates ESOP and duplicates post-investment protection offered by the
Securities Acts, ERISA does not bar investors from invoking the Securi-
ties Acts to protect their pre-investment interests.
IV. AN INSIDER'S, DTrrk To DIsCLOSE MATERIAL FRACTS:
GARCIA V. CORDOVA
A. Introduction
Garcia v. Cordova 122 involved a securities fraud claim Eind the stan-
dards applicable in determining the materiality of insider informa-
tion.1 23 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
whether the purchase of stock by a corporate insider triggers a duty
under Rule lOb-5(b) 124 to disclose corporate asset appraisal informa-
tion known in the industry as "soft information."'
2 5
B. Background
In 1983, the defendant Gil Cordova became president of Westland
Development Company.' 2 6 Between November 1983 and June 1986,
Cordova purchased a total of 2513 shares of Westland stock from plain-
tiffs. 12 7 Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Cordova had committed fraud by fail-
ing to disclose the value of certain assets and the results of various
appraisals that had been performed on portions of Westland's holdings.
The purchase price, ranging from $4.62 per share to $8.65 per share,
was lower than what the plaintiffs believed' the shares were really
worth.128 Defendant does not dispute that he knew of the asset appraisal
information.'
29
122. 930 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 827.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to its authority under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 7.8j (1988).
125. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 827. Asset appraisals have traditionally been considered "soft
information." Soft information is information about a particular issuer or its securities
that inherently involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation, such as projections, esti-
mates, opinions, motives, or intentions. Hard information is typically historical or other
factual information that is objectively verifiable. Id. at 830.
126. Westland is a community land grant corporation whose primary capital asset is
approximately forty-nine thousand acres of raw land located mostly within the ancient
boundaries of the Atrisco land grant west of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Id. at 827.
127. The plaintiffs, Candido Garcia, Adela Baros, and the Special Administrator of the
Estate of Fedelina Munoz, initially brought separate actions against the defendant. The
complaints were subsequently consolidated into one action in the District Court for the
District of New Mexico. Id. at 826.
128. Id. at 828.
129. The information known to Mr. Cordova included: 1) a land appraisal of the bulk
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In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, a
jury entered verdicts against defendant for compensatory and punitive
damages for securities fraud and violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act' 30 violations, and in favor of the defend-
ant on the common-law fraud claims. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part,
vacating judgment for punitive damages and RICO violations, but de-
nied the motion with regard to securities fraud claim.' 3 1 The Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that the asset appraisal information was immaterial as a
matter of law due to its speculative and unreliable nature, thereby re-
moving any duty of disclosure; and that the question of securities
fraud'8 2 should not have been presented to thejury.'3 3 The case was
ultimately remanded for reconsideration.'
3 4
C. Analysis
The court concluded that the determination of materiality in this
case was a mixed question of law and fact. Because the issue was more
legal than factual, the court's review was de novo.135 There are two ra-
tionales supporting the court's conclusion. First, Rule lOb-5 provides
that it is unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement or omit a
true statement of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. '3 6 Second, insiders involved in securities transactions have
a further affirmative duty to "disclose material facts which are known to
them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal, and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment." 137 Further, if the disclosure cannot be made, the insider is
obligated to abstain from trading.'3 8
In Garcia, defendant was an officer and director of Westland with
access to the asset information in question. The court held defendant to
be an "insider" because of his access to the information, finding he had
a duty to disclose any material information. 139 The question of whether
defendant had a duty to disclose was intertwined with the question of
whether the appraisals were material fact, and was, therefore, more a
of Westland's real estate holdings done for Westland in 1976 for the purpose of determin-
ing how much title insurance to purchase; 2) forty-five separate appraisals of smaller par-
cels of Westland property done between 1971 and mid-1986; 3) Westland's record of
comparable land sales; and 4) an opinion from Morgan Stanley, prepared for Westland's
Board of Directors, valuing the corporation's stock. Id. at 830.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
131. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 826.
132. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim under any of the subparagraphs (a), (b),
and/or (c) of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 827.
133. Id.





139. Id. at 829.
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question of law than of fact.' 40
The standard for materiality in securities issues is found in TSC In-
dustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc..1 4 1 In TSC Industries, the Court held that
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote."' 14 2 Although, initially, this appears to be a question of fact, it is to
be resolved as a matter of law where the information is "so obviously
important or unimportant to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality."' 143 In its analysis, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that all parties agreed the information at issue was the type
referred to in the securities industry as "soft information." While ac-
knowledging that courts have taken various approaches to determine the
necessity of disclosing soft information, 14 4 the Garcia court followed the
Fifth Circuit.' 4 5 The dispositive factors identified by the Fifth Circuit
were: the nature of the undisclosed predictive information and the im-
portance, reliability and investor impact of this information, as deter-
mined from the facts of each case.146
In Garcia, the soft information at issue was believed too speculative
and unreliable to require disclosure under Rule lOb-5 as a "material
fact." The court reasoned that the date of an appraisal is a crucial factor
in determining its reliability. 14 7 Here, the 1976 appraisal was done
solely for purposes of determining how much title insurance Westland
should buy and was six years out-of-date at the time of defendant's first
purchase from plaintiffs. Further, the $20 million title insurance policy
was disclosed to all shareholders in a footnote to the financial state-
ments beginning with the first annual report.' 48 Although the court did
not indicate an exact age at which information will be deemed too old,
the court held that six-year-old appraisal information was outdated and
too unreliable to be material.
Second, the forty-five smaller appraisals done for Westland between
140. Id.
141. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
142. Id. The materiality standard is not set too low because a minimal standard would
result in avalanches of information that would bury stockholders in trivia, a result the
Court has condemned as "hardly conducive to informed decision making." Id. at 448-49.
The TSC Industries standard was initially applied to materiality under Rule 14a-3 regarding
a proxy statement, although the standard has also been held to apply in the section 10(b)
and the Rule lOb-5 context. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 829 n. 1; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
143. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
144. See Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 707-09 (4th Cir. 1986) (financial pro-
jections require only voluntary disclosure), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); see also Janet
E. Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 MD. L. REv. 1071
(1987) (Third Circuit requires disclosure on a case by case basis; Sixth and Ninth Circuits
require disclosure where information is substantially certain).
145. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 830 (citing Isquith v. Middle S. Util. Inc., 847 F.2d 196, 206
(5th Cir.) (the Tenth Circuit did not reveal its analysis of the alternative approaches men-
tioned), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988)).
146. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 830.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 830 n.2.
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1971 and mid-1986 addressed no more than two and one-half percent of
Westland's total holdings. 14 9 Any conclusion drawn from the data
would not be significant enough to be considered material. In addition
to the age and quantity of the appraisals, the limited usefulness of the
information to the Westland directors rendered the information imma-
terial for purposes of disclosure under Rule lOb-5(b).
Third, the record of comparable land sales was also held immaterial
due to its age.1 50 Because too few sales had transpired in the period
before the alleged fraudulent purchases, the information was not con-
sidered material.
Fourth, the stock valuation done by Morgan Stanley was presented
in August 1987, well after defendant's last purchase from any plaintiff.
Further, the information presented was speculative and without factual
basis, and was not relied on by Westland directors.' 5 1 The Morgan
Stanley information was held immaterial and not subject to disclosure




Analysis of the duty to disclose soft information varies among the
circuit courts. Most courts hold the age of appraisal information to be a
crucial factor in determining its materiality. 153 In the Tenth Circuit, the
determinative factors include: the age of the information; the quantity
of information; the determination of whether the information was relied
upon by a company in making business decisions; and whether the infor-
mation is available to stockholders in any form. In Garcia, six year old
appraisal information was too old, aggregate appraisals addressing only
two and one-half percent of total holdings were not significant enough,
and the information was disclosed to all shareholders in each of the an-
nual financial statements. The court appeared to rely less on the cur-
rentness of information than on the availability of the information to the
selling shareholders.
149. Id. at 831.
150. Id.
151. In an informal presentation to Westland directors, the Westland stock was valued
at between $40.00 and $100.00 per share. No basis for these figures was given and no
explanation for the wide range was offered. Id. at 83 1.
152. In a final discussion, the court addressed the possibility of district court error with
respect to jury instructions that included the full text of Rule 10(b)-5. The court agreed
that subparagraph 5(b) was applicable to this case and concluded paragraphs 5(a) and/or
(c), while applicable, would not help the plaintiff. Because there was no evidence to sup-
port a reasonable inference that Mr. Cordova employed a "device, scheme or artifice" to
defraud, or that he "engaged in any act, practice or course of business... operating as a
fraud," the district court did not commit error by presenting subparagraphs 5(a) and (c)
with the proper subparagraph 5(b) to the jury. Id. at 831-32.
153. Id. at 830 (citing Interpretative Release Relating to Proxy Rules, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.




Based on the cases analyzed during this survey period, the Tenth
Circuit will probably not be accused of showing favoritism to investor,
seller, or issuer. In First Golden and Garcia, the corporate insider
purchasing securities received the strictest judicial review. In First
Golden, the court found strict liability for the purchase and subsequent
sale of securities within six months. Further, the court followed well-
established precedent in denying the insider's request for relief from
liability through indemnification from a third party. In Garcia, however,
the court permitted the corporate insider's purchase of stock from
shareholders, because the appraisal, or "soft information," allegedly
withheld from shareholders was published in the annual report. More
importantly, the court found the information was outdated and unrelia-
ble, and therefore did not require disclosure to the purchasers.
The investors in Uselton and Anixter also split a victory and loss in the
Tenth Circuit. The Uselton court applied the well-accepted Howey test to
determine that an ESOP was an investment contract and therefore a se-
curity subject to federal security regulation. The court found that
although the ERISA regulation of ESOPs protects participants in the
plan, the regulation does not prevent the Securities Acts from protect-
ing the investor prior to the investment decision. In Anixter however, a
strict interpretation of the section 13 one-year three-year statute of limi-
tations prevented an otherwise valid claim regardless of the complexity
and passive nature of the fraud. The limitations exist in part, for the
protection of corporate issuers who would otherwise forever be in fear
of litigation, and should be evenly applied to all situations, even where it
protects the party committing fraud. After the Anixter decision, each in-
vestor is responsible for observing the "storm signals" that might indi-
cate fraud is afoot.
With each reversal of the lower court, the Tenth Circuit strictly in-
terpreted the federal statutes, gave judicial deference to federal court
precedent, and evenhandedly applied the Securities Acts to all parties. It
appears from these cases that future litigants should appeal to the Tenth
Circuit only after careful analysis of the lower court decisions, and after
paying rigorous attention to statutory interpretation and federal prece-
dent dealing with the Securities Acts.
Mark A. Guetlich
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